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mortgage are “underwater,”2 meaning that these homeowners have borrowed more than their homes are 
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carry out a “strategic default.”3 
Keywords 
underwater, housing prices, homeowners, underwater homeowners, mortgage payments, strategic 
default, promissory note, morality, efficiency, Cornell, real estate 
This article is available in Cornell Real Estate Review: https://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/crer/vol9/iss1/7 
32
exhibit AFiller Text
Given the recent, sharp decline in housing prices,
1 an estimated 20% of homeowners 
with a mortgage are “underwater,”2 meaning that these homeowners have 
borrowed more than their homes are currently worth.  Of those underwater 
homeowners, many can still afford to make their monthly mortgage payments.  Given the 
negative equity in their homes, however, they are faced with the decision whether to carry 
out a “strategic default.”3
A June 2010 report estimates that roughly 20% of mortgage defaults in the first half of 
2009 were strategic.4  This has lead to innumerable newspaper articles, blog posts, website 
comments and editorial musings5 on the morality of homeowners who can afford to pay but 
choose, instead, to walk away.  This Article centers on the current public discourse about 
strategic default, which mirrors an ongoing debate among scholars concerning whether 
the breach of a contract has a moral dimension.  The example of strategic default provides 
a rich avenue to discuss the foundational assumptions and challenges of contract theory, 
and demonstrates that the public debate would be more aptly focused on systemic reforms 
rather than individual contracts between borrowers and lenders.   
There is a continuing debate among legal scholars regarding competing theoretical 
justifications for why and how the law enforces contractual obligations.  For those that 
maintain that it is possible to describe and prescribe contract law with a general, unifying 
theory, the debate is primarily one between promise-based theories and economic 
theory.  This debate between promissory and economic theory reflects a perpetual volley 
concerning whether contract law should reflect the primacy of morality or efficiency.  Given 
the ubiquity of strategic defaults, this academic debate is now prominently on display in 
the mainstream public media.
CBS’s 60 minutes featured a segment that frames the decision facing underwater 
1  David Streitfield & Javier Hernandez, Home Prices May Be Nearing a New Dip, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2009, B1, http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/11/25/business/economy/25home.html?_r=1&ref=standard_poors_caseshiller_home_price_index (discussing Case-Schiller national 
index of housing prices, which was 29.1% off from the peak of the market in 2006). 
2  Scott Lanman, Bernake Says Regulators ‘Intensely’ Reviewing Foreclosures, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 25, 2010), at http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2010-10-25/bernanke-says-regulators-are-intensively-reviewing-foreclosure-practices.html (quoting Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Ber-
nanke); see also David H. Stevens, Assistant Secretary for Housing / Federal Housing Administration Commissioner U.S. Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development, Written Testimony before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity U.S. House Committee on 
Financial Services (Apr. 14, 2010), http://portal.hud.gov/portal/page/portal/HUD/press/speeches_remarks_statements/2010/Speech_04142010. 
  20% is a nationwide estimate, with some of the harder hit regional markets showing higher estimates.  For example, it is estimated that more 
than 20% of mortgages are underwater in California, Florida and Nevada.  “Underwater Mortgages” May Not Spell Default: SF Fed, ABC 
NEWS (Oct. 18, 2010), at http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=11908600 (Reuters).
3  Strategic default describes the situation where a home borrower has the financial ability to continue to pay her mortgage but chooses not 
to  pay  and walks  away.    See Luigi  Zingales, The Menace of Strategic Default,  CITY  JOURNAL  (Spring  2010),  http://www.city-journal.
org/2010/20_2_strategic-mortgage-default.html.  Zingales notes, “[s]trategic default is hard to define, of course, and presents difficulties for re-
searchers.  What exactly does it mean to be able to pay a mortgage?  If I default because I’m unwilling to work extra hours to pay my mortgage, 
is that a strategic default or a necessary one?”
4  Posting of Nick Timiraos to WSJ DEVELOPMENTS BLOG, Study: Nearly One in Five Mortgage Defaults are ‘Strategic’, http://blogs.wsj.
com/developments/2010/06/28/study-nearly-one-in-five-mortgage-defaults-are-strategic/  
  However, given the difficulty in identifying which defaults are strategic, some have suggested that the reports of strategic default are widely 
exaggerated.  See Richard DeKasser, Rise in ‘Strategic Default’ in Mortgages May Be Exaggerated, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2010, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/05/AR2010080507381.html
5  See e.g. James B. Stewart, ‘Strategic Defaults’? I Agree With Fannie, WALL STREET JOURNAL ONLINE, Jun. 30, 2010, http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703374104575336672476924564.html;  Editorial,  Strategic Defaults on Mortgages: The price we pay 
for the housing folly, LA TIMES, Jun. 14, 2020, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/14/opinion/la-ed-default-20100614; Kenneth R. Harney, 
The Nation’s Housing: Walking Away From a Mortgage, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ar-
ticle/2009/11/25/AR2009112504186.html; Liz Pullman Weston, Are You Foolish to Pay Your Mortgage?, MSN MONEY, Dec. 9, 2009, http://
articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Banking/HomeFinancing/weston-should-you-walk-away-from-your-home.aspx.
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homeowners who can afford to make their mortgage payments.  It contained the following 
exchange with a couple that was preparing to walk away from their home:
MORLEY SAFER (voiceover): . . . Jane Ellen Schoolick and Danny Keune . . . 
bought their Phoenix bungalow three years ago for nearly four hundred thousand 
dollars.  The bank now values it at eighty-five thousand.  Even though they can 
afford the mortgage payments, they felt like they were trying to bail out an ocean 
with a bucket.  
JANE ELLEN SCHOOLICK: No logical businessperson would do anything other 
than walk away.  And-- so there was a lot of soul searching and I did a lot of crying 
because I’m in love with this house, and--  and every day I would redo the math 
and think maybe we miss[ed] something.  May—you know, this just can’t be right.
MORLEY SAFER (voiceover): But it was.  The value of their house was dropping 
anywhere from five to eight thousand dollars a month.  So Schoolick and Kuene 
just felt it was time to walk away.
JANE ELLEN SCHOOLICK: I don’t think [we’re villains].  I--we fulfilled the parts 
of our contract that we have with the bank.  We’ve let them know what we’re 
doing.  It’s all legal.  It’s not anything I’ve expected I would be doing.  And it sure 
doesn’t feel good, but it seems like it’s the right thing to do.6
In a New York Times Sunday Magazine article, Roger Lowenstein supported the decision 
to walk away.  Lowenstein wrote:
Mortgage holders do sign a promissory note, which is a promise to pay.  But the 
contract explicitly details the penalty for nonpayment – surrender of the property. 
The borrower isn’t escaping the consequences; he is suffering them.7
However, James B. Stewart, a columnist for SmartMoney magazine, expressed a view 
less sympathetic to the borrowers.  In light of the apparent increase in strategic defaults, 
in June 2010 Fannie Mae announced that it would deny government-backed mortgages 
for seven years to borrowers who strategically defaulted.  In agreeing with Fannie Mae’s 
decision, Stewart wrote: “‘strategic default’ is too kind a phrase for breaking a promise and 
breaching a contract.”8
This popular media coverage has the public debating the ethics of strategic default. 
For example, a May 31, 2010 article in the New York Times, titled “Owners Stop Paying 
Mortgages, and Stop Fretting,”9 lead to a surfeit of both exceedingly supportive and 
bitterly disapproving reader comments (the article generated over 830 reader comments). 
Many comments chastised the defaulting homeowners, calling them “deadbeats” and 
6 60 Minutes: Mortgages: Walking Away (CBS broadcast May 9, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=6470184n&tag=contentB
ody (transcript on file with author).  
  NPR’s Morning Edition recently ran a similar story.  Yuki Noguchi, The Delimma of Walking Away from a Mortgage, NPR Morning Edition 
(Oct. 28, 2010), at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130868236.  The story begins:
To pay or not to pay is the question now facing some homeowners — not because they can’t afford their mortgage, but because they don’t want 
to keep paying on a home that’s lost value.
  But even as they gain popularity, strategic defaults are highly controversial — some might say immoral. About a quarter of American home-
owners took out loans that are bigger than their homes are now worth, and some of them say it’s simply irrational for them to keep paying the 
mortgage.
  Grace Chen and her husband, Antonis Orphanou, have this debate about their own home. From the outside, there is nothing to flag them as 
troubled homeowners. They haven’t lost their jobs. Their interest rate has stayed the same. They are not counted among the legions headed to 
foreclosure. In fact, they haven’t missed a single mortgage payment.
  But they’re tempted to.
7 Roger Lowenstein, Walk Away From Your Mortgage!, NY TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE, at 15 (Jan. 7, 2010).
8  Stewart, note 5 supra.
9  David Streitfeld, Owners Stop Paying Mortgages, and Stop Fretting, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2010, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/01/
business/01nopay.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2
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“freeloaders” and arguing that they had acted “shamefully.”  Other comments supported 
the homeowners in walking away, denying any moral dimension to strategic default and 
citing the “free market.”10
As this conversation takes place in the popular media, the lack of unanimity on the issue 
falls along the same poles as the academic debate: morality and efficiency.  The argument 
of those that support strategic default reads like a case for efficient breach.11  Many of these 
commentators argue that the mortgage contract simply presents home borrowers with a 
choice: pay or surrender the property in foreclosure.  If a homeowner is deep underwater, 
she is better off defaulting and the lender is no worse off relative to the bargain (after all, the 
lender agreed to foreclosure as a remedy).  However, those who argue in favor of strategic 
default are counteracting a prevailing social norm12 that it is fundamentally immoral to 
efficiently breach a contract.  Many of the blog comments and even newspaper editorials 
have reflected a general sense that the homeowners who strategically default are acting 
contemptibly.
The public discussion further mirrors the academic debate about whether encouraging 
efficient breach enables the greatest public good or, instead, undermines the very 
convention of contracting.  On the one hand, strategic default serves as an example of 
how encouragement of breach of contract may lead to a breakdown of confidence in the 
marketplace and, in turn, could inhibit market activity.  On the other, it is difficult to muster 
sympathy for lenders, whose imprudent loans are a large piece of the systemic problems 
that gave rise to the collapse of the housing market.  
In this debate over strategic default, it is seen that questions of morality are nuanced and 
contextual.  This specific example elucidates the futility of either morality or efficiency as a 
unifying descriptive or normative theory of contract law.  Therefore, instead of focusing on 
individual contracts, it would be more fruitful to refocus the public debate to appropriate 
incentives to keep borrowers in their homes13 and systemic reforms that would prevent the 
practices that played a part in devastating outcomes for the housing industry, families and 
communities.
10  The true identities and allegiances of  the commenters  is not known; nevertheless, some of  their postings are worth noting because they 
encapsulate the debate.  “amac3” from Illinois commented:
  It says a lot about the descent of human character to see that even people who can meet their contractural [sic] debts refuse to do so. They 
didn’t hate the banks that lent them the money until their spend-as-you-go lifestyle caught up with them. I have nothing against people who 
suffered health and employment setbacks in this economy and cannot pay. But the ones that simply made a bad decision and now feel everyone 
is responsible for it are neither to be admired or excused.
  “Mike” from Austin also criticized the homeowners for walking away:
  This is shameful. As a person who has always been careful with debt, who never used a house as a cash machine, I can’t find much sympathy 
for these folks. They’re adults, they signed a contract and they sure as heck would have owned up to it if things had gone their way. But now 
they can say the lenders were “crooks” and use that to justify what amounts to felony theft.
  This article seems to be an apology, almost a justification for their behavior. No mention that the rest of us pick up the tab either through higher 
costs or higher taxes. Perhaps some of the lenders were crooks, but there’s no doubting that these people are essentially stealing. Don’t cover 
for bad behavior.
  But commenter “Jane Smiley” of California did not see any moral failings:
  This is how the free market works, folks. There’s no morality involved--you make the best deal you can get away with. Ask Milton Friedman 
whether there’s something “immoral” about this. Of course not! The market isn’t “moral”, it is required to adjust itself. If we are going to live 
in a free market, then we citizens can’t be patsies anymore than the bankers and the traders. Is this another step toward criminality? Sure. But 
why should bankers and traders and politicians be the only criminals?
  “Alex” from New York also showed his support for the homeowners who chose to walk away.  In part, he wrote:
  I support these homeowners wholeheartedly. If banks will not work with troubled, underwater borrowers to modify loans (and they will not), 
let the borrowers modify the loans on their own terms.
  The upside: Money not spent on a mortgage payment can be spent on goods and services that will stimulate local economies, rather than to 
enhance profits for bank shareholders.
 See comments to David Streitfeld, Owners Stop Paying Mortgages, and Stop Fretting, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2010, at A1, http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/06/01/business/01nopay.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2
11  For a definition of “efficient breach,” see footnotes 21 through 27 and accompanying text.
12 See footnote 55 and accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., Gregory Scott Crespi, The Trillion Dollar Problem of Underwater Homeowners: Avoiding a New Surge of Foreclosures By Encour-
aging Principal-Reducing Loan Modifications, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 153 (2010).
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Morality v. Efficiency:  
Is it Immoral to “Willfully” Breach a Contract?
There is a continuing debate among legal scholars regarding competing theoretical 
justifications for why and how the law enforces contractual obligations.  The debate is 
primarily one between promise-based theories and economic theory.14  The promised-
based view holds that contracting is an act of promising and the law enforces contracts 
because there is a moral obligation to keep a promise.15  Grounded in economic theory, the 
other prevailing view is that contract law encourages exchanges that are “efficient,” those 
that maximize individual gains and, in turn, societal wealth.16 
Champions of both of these views have addressed the legal consequences of breaching 
a contract.  One of the challenges for theorists is to explain why conventional contract 
doctrine does not take into account a breaching party’s motive and whether the breaching 
party has acted “willfully.”  The expectation measure of damages aims to put the non-
breaching party in the position she would have been in had the contract been performed.17 
In other words, contract law damages are based upon the non-breaching party’s loss 
in value that foreseeably arose from the breach of contract.18  This calculation is purely 
compensatory and remains unaffected by the culpability of the breaching party.19  Thus, 
punitive damages are unavailable and specific performance is rarely awarded, regardless 
of the reasons for the breach.20  It is largely (if not entirely) irrelevant why the breaching 
party failed to follow through on her promise.  For example, in an apartment lease, it would 
be irrelevant whether the tenant failed to pay rent because she lost her job or because a 
better deal arose for another, nearby apartment.  The tenant’s motives or reasons for breach 
simply do not matter.
Law and economics scholars argue that the expectation measure of damages can be 
explained as encouraging “efficient breach.”  An efficient breach occurs when the cost 
of a party’s performance of the contract “exceeds the benefits to all the parties.”21  The 
theory of efficient breach maintains that “if a party breaches, and is still better off after 
paying damages to compensate the victim,. . . . considered as a unit, the parties are better 
off because of the breach and the breach makes no party worse off.”22  It is said that “[an 
efficient breach] induces a result superior to performance, since one party receives the same 
benefits as performance while the other is able to do even better.”23
Notably, efficient breach does not provide a doctrinal excuse for a party’s nonperformance 
of the contract; in other words, efficient breach is not a defense to breach of contract.24 
Rather, it is a theory that recognizes why a party might be motivated to breach.  The theory 
appropriates Holmes’ dictum that “[t]he duty to keep a contract. . . means a prediction 
14  Brian Bix, Contract Rights and Remedies, and the Divergence Between Law and Morality, 21 RATIO JURIS 194, 195-199 (2008) (hereinaf-
ter “Bix”).  As Professor Bix discusses, reliance-based arguments are often thrown into the mix, but they seem to be derivative of the promissory 
and efficiency theories.  Id. at 197-198. 
15  CHARLES FRIED, CONTACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION, 16-17 (Harvard University Press 1981).
16  ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS at 12 (2000).  Notably, Steven Feldman ably argues that this is a debate 
among scholars because the courts have overwhelmingly taken the side of morality over efficiency.  Steven W. Feldman, Autonomy and Ac-
countability in the Law of Contracts: A Response to Professor Shiffrin, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 178, 183-203 (2009).
17  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 347.   
18 Id.
19  Richard Caswell, When is a Willful Breach ‘Willful’? The Link Between Definitions and Damages, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1501, 1501 (2009) 
(“Liability for breach of contract is often described as a form of strict liability, in which the measure of damages is unaffected by the culpability 
of the breach.”)
20  E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.3 (3d ed. 1999); see also Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and 
Moral Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405, 409 (2009)(hereinafter “Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron”).
21  Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz & Richard Crawell, Chapter on the Law & Economics of Contracts, in THE HANDBOOK OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS at 99 (2007).
22  CALAMARI & PERILLO § 14.36, at 620.
23  Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement 
Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 558 (1977).
24  Irma S. Russell, The Broken Promise of Efficient Breach: Sacrificing Certainty for False Efficiency (2007), http://works.bepress.com/irma_
russell/2, at 26, n 116 (discussing efficient breach as theory, not excuse of contractual performance).
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that you must pay damages if you do not keep it, -- and nothing else.”25 Under this view, 
where a party has assumed obligations pursuant to a contract, that party is presented with 
a simple choice: perform or pay damages.
Proponents of efficiency theory argue that a party who stands to benefit from the 
breach after paying damages should breach.26  They contend that, by using an expectation 
measure of damages, contract doctrine incentivizes efficient breach and is, in turn, welfare 
maximizing.  If contract law allowed for punitive damages or otherwise measured damages 
in reference to the culpability of the breaching party, many breaches would be inefficient -- it 
would be rare for a breaching party to be better off after paying the other party’s damages.27
The efficiency theory of contract law has been subject to criticism, including the 
argument that efficient breach relies upon “a number of simplifying assumptions that do 
not hold in the real world.”28  It has been argued that, among other things, efficient breach 
does not account for transaction costs or the limitations on damages that prevent a party 
from recovering all of her actual losses.29  It has further been argued that efficient breach 
fails to account for any reputational harm to the breaching party.30  The most disarming 
opposition to efficiency theory, however, is a fundamental criticism that it fails to take into 
account any moral dimension of breaching a contract.31
The moral view of contract doctrine justifies the law as a means to affirm the sanctity 
of promises.  In Contract as Promise, Professor Charles Fried equated contracting with 
promising.  He wrote of the binding nature of promises as a matter of personal autonomy 
and social norms:
An individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally 
invoked a convention whose function it is to give grounds – moral grounds – for 
another to expect the promised performance.  To renege is to abuse a confidence he 
was free to invite or not, and which he intentionally did invite.32
In this connection, some theorists generally condemn contract doctrine’s amorality,33 
and contract theory is, thus, often presented as a polarity between efficiency and morality.34 
Increasingly, this polarity has itself been impugned as “artificial” and “unduly 
simplistic,”35 giving rise to what might be characterized as a more intermediate approach 
that eschews the rigid poles.  For example, Professor Seana Shiffrin argues that “[a]lthough 
the law should not aim to enforce interpersonal morality as such, the law’s content should 
be compatible with the conditions necessary for moral agency to flourish.”36  Even in 
articulating this intermediate view, however, she rejects the efficiency view of contact law.37 
25  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Dedication, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897); see also RICHARD POSNER, THE ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 119 (6th ed. 2003) (describing Holmes’ insight as overbroad dictum).
26  CALAMARI & PERILLO § 14.36, at 620.
27 Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985)(Posner, J. explains common law rule against punitive damages 
in contract law in terms of efficiency).
28  Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1098 
(1999-2000).
29 Id. at 1098.
30 Id. at 1099. 
31  Bix note 14 supra, at 198 (citing Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical Integration Strategy, 
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 11: SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY), at 420-441 (2001) and STEPHEN A. SMITH, INTRO-
DUCTION TO CONTRACT THEORY (Oxford 2004)).
32  Fried note 15 supra at 16-17.
33  Sheana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 710 n.2  (2006-2007)  (hereinafter “Shif-
frin, Contract and Promise”)(citing Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies – Efficacy, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 
COLUM. L. REV 111 (1981); Frank Menetrez, Consequentialism, Promissory Obligation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 47 UCLA L. 
REV. 859, 879-80 (2000)).
34  Shiffrin, Contract and Promise, note 33 supra, at 711; Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Objectivity and Subjectivity in Contract Law: A Copernican 
Response to Professor Shiffrin, 21 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 399, 400 (2008) (hereinafter “Lipshaw”).
35  Shiffrin, Contract and Promise, note 33 supra, at 711; Lipshaw note 34 supra, at 400.
36  Shiffrin, Contract and Promise, note 33 supra, at 710; Seanna Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551, 
1552 (2008-2009) (hereinafter, “Shiffrin, Immoral?”).
37  Barbara H. Fried, What’s Morality Got to Do With It?, 120 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 53 (200?)(characterizing Professor Shiffrin’s position 
as “intermediate”).
Professor Shiffrin writes:
The efficient-breach rationale forwards a justification for a legal doctrine that 
consists in the claim that barring punitive damages would encourage and facilitate 
certain breaching behavior.  But this behavior is condemned by morality.  To the 
extent that law adopts and embodies this rationale, it thereby embraces and tries 
to encourage and facilitate immoral behavior.38
Shiffrin does not argue that all breaches are morally wrong; she recognizes that morality 
requires more than a yes or no answer to the question ‘was there a promise?’  She argues 
that some breaches are morally wrong and the law should recognize immoral breaches 
with the availability of punitive remedies, “including blame, criticism, recrimination, and 
avoidance.”39
In response, economic theorists have not necessarily disagreed that some breaches of 
contract may, in certain limited instances, be immoral.  For example, Professor Steven Shavell 
divides the world of contracts into those that specifically provide for a contingency and 
those that do not.40  In the situation where a contract expressly provides for a contingency, 
then a moral duty to perform is governed by the contract.41  In the situation, however, 
where the contract does not speak to the parties’ rights or obligations upon the occurrence 
of an event, Professor Shavell argues that “the moral duty to perform is governed by what 
a completely detailed contract addressing the contingency would have stipulated.”42   
Professor Shavell provides, among other examples, a contract for snow removal. 
According to his argument, if the contract expressly requires snow removal even if the 
clearing equipment is stolen, then the snow remover assumed a moral duty to clear the 
snow, even if the equipment is stolen.  However, in the more common situation where the 
contract does not provide for this or any number of other possible contingencies, Professor 
Shavell argues that the snow remover’s moral obligation is defined by what the parties 
would have hypothetically agreed in a complete contract, which he presumes to be that the 
snow remover is absolved of his duty if the equipment is stolen.  
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Professor Shavell’s claim is that the 
“hypothetical” complete contract would only require performance by a party (here, the 
snow remover) when the cost of performance (removing the snow) would be less than 
the value of the performance to the other party (the land owner).  In essence, Shavell’s 
claim is that the hypothetical complete contract provides for efficient breach and, therefore, 
supplies the relative moral obligations among the parties.43
To make matters more complex, both Shiffrin and Shavell challenge “morality” as a 
fixed, unwavering principle.  Both of them recognize the possibility that some, but not all, 
breaches of contract may be immoral.  Surrounding each contract is a unique context that 
can significantly affect the assessment of the morality of a breach.44
In these arguments, it is seen that, fundamentally, neither efficiency nor morality can 
ably explain all of contract law.  To the extent these poles are even useful or accurate as 
justifications for contract doctrine, they are both all right and all wrong.  If not all promises 
are sacrosanct, then the compass of morality does not guide in all cases.  Likewise, because 
the goal of efficiency fails to account for the instances where there is a promise that carries a 
moral duty to perform, it cannot provide a consistent, universal theory of the law.
The principles of efficiency and morality fail to provide a unifying descriptive or 
38  Shiffrin, Immoral?, note 36 supra, at 1552.
39  Shiffrin, Immoral?, note 36 supra, at 1551.
40  Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given the Incompleteness of Contracts, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1570 
(2009) (hereinafter, “Shavell”).
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1572.
44  Bix note 14 supra at 204 (discussing Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Practices, 19 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 199 (1990)).
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normative explanation for contract law, and the competing justifications have yet to be 
harmonized.45 In recognition of the polarity of the debate (or perhaps in spite of it) more 
theorists are drawn to a decided pragmatism.46
One common strain of this pragmatism is to compartmentalize or sub-categorize 
areas of contract law or to focus on status-based differences among parties.  For instance, 
Professor Jeffrey Lipshaw notes that theories about contract law often treat business entities 
and individuals differently.47  The moralists have a tendency to limit their justification of 
contract doctrine to individuals, and the champions of efficiency often limit their theories 
to sophisticated business entities.48  By making these distinctions among actors in the 
marketplace, these theorists can acknowledge the imbalances of bargaining power that exist 
in the market and evade counterarguments that their theories are unfair or oversimplified.
More generally, the scholarly competition between efficiency and morality has been 
framed around what is purported to enable the greatest public good.  Economists argue 
that efficient breach makes the parties to the contract better off and, in turn, efficiently 
allocates the world’s resources and increases the public wealth.49  However, it has also 
been argued that, if the law encourages breach of contract, efficient or otherwise, it will 
lead to a breakdown of trust in the marketplace and, in turn, could actually inhibit market 
activity.50  Efficient breach, it has been argued, undermines fundamental aims of contract 
law – predictability and certainty in the marketplace.51
Even proponents of efficiency theory recognize the social norms at play.  They 
acknowledge that there is a “tension” between the law’s lack of concern for the motives 
of the breaching party and the “felt sense that a wrong has been done when contracts are 
broken.”52  Adding to this discussion, there is also recent consideration of the intuition of 
those acting in the marketplace.  A psychological study by Professors Tess Wilkinson-Ryan 
and Jonathan Baron suggests that subjects would impose higher damages on a breaching 
party who willfully breaches a contract, and that moral culpability of the breaching party 
was a salient factor in assessing damages.53
Another of Professor Wilkinson-Ryan’s studies found, however, that moral intuitions 
about breach of contract are not immutable.  The study suggested that people were more 
likely to breach a contract that contained a liquidated damages clause, presumably because 
the agreed remedy changed the parties’ understanding about the nature and content of the 
promises made in the contract.54  This appears to support Professor Shavell’s argument, at 
least to the extent that expressly stated remedies would define the moral obligations of the 
parties.
Remarkably, with the current prominence of strategic default, the polarity between 
morality and efficiency has taken center stage in the popular press, mirroring the ongoing 
debate among legal scholars.
45  Lipshaw note 34 supra, at 408 (efficiency and morality will never be harmonized).
46  Professor Brian Bix has argued that theories should be “localized to a particular jurisdiction and/or to a particular sub-categories of Contract 
Law.”  Bix note 14 supra, at 195; see also Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1483 (2004-2005); Lipshaw 
note 34 supra.
47   Lipshaw note 34 supra, at 400-01.  See generally Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and The False Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40 Wake 
Forest L. Rev. 295, 298 (2005) (discussing merchants and consumers as status-based dichotomies in contract law); Meredith R. Miller, Contract 
Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MISSOURI L. REV. 493 (2010) (discussing theoretical and doctrinal importance of 
party sophistication).
48 Id. at 401. 
49 See Russell note 24 supra, at 19-20 (discussing “wealth maximization” as envisioned by economists).
50  CALAMARI & PERILLO § 14.36, at 620.
51  Russell note 24 supra, at 4-5, 31-32.
52  Shavell note 40 supra, at 1570.
53 See generally Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, note 20 supra.
54  Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Efficient Breach?  A Psychological Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV 633, 637 
(2009-2010).
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The Public Debate: Application of Theory to Strategic Default
With strategic default, the generalized public sentiment appears to account for a moral 
dimension of breach of contract.  When it comes to a mortgage contract, social norms favor 
payment when possible.  According to surveys, a decided majority of Americans believe 
that it is immoral to strategically default on a mortgage.55  In a series of incisive articles, 
Professor Professor Brent T. White, a law professor at the University of Arizona, has gained 
much attention for his zealous encouragement of underwater homeowners (especially in 
non-recourse states)56 to walk away from their homes.  Professor White has challenged 
the social norms, arguing that homeowners should counteract shame, fear and emotional 
drivers and default when it is financially rational to do so.57
Professor White’s argument clearly sides with efficiency and the “perform or pay” 
position in the poles between efficiency and morality.  He writes: “a mortgage contract, 
like all other contracts, is purely a legal document, not a sacred promise.”58  He continues 
to argue that there is “absolutely nothing immoral about exercising your option to breach, 
” especially when it is “financially wise to do so.”59  In fact, Professor White argues that, 
in some instances, including strategic default, the most moral action is to breach the contract.60
It is worth noting that Professor White does not argue that the homeowners have not 
breached the mortgage contract when they walk away.  He does not argue, and it does 
not appear that anyone has seriously argued, that there is a conventional doctrinal reason 
that the homeowners are excused from their obligations – in other words, the traditional 
defenses of mistake, fraud and impracticability or frustration of purpose are not an 
appropriate doctrinal fit to excuse the homeowners from paying the loans. 61
Rather, White and others are recognizing that the homeowners are in breach if they 
walk away, but that they should do so anyway and it is not immoral if they make that 
choice.
In essence, the encouragement of strategic default reads like a case for efficient breach.62 
The defaulting homeowner is arguably better off walking away than continuing to repay a 
loan that far exceeds the value of the home.  This is especially true the farther underwater 
the borrower sinks – that is, the more negative equity in the home, the more incentive there 
is to walk away.63  Another factor is the time it takes for the lender to foreclose – the longer 
the delay, the longer the defaulting homeowner can live in the house “rent free,” and the 
55  Bob Tedeschi, Home Owners Walking Away, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 25, 2009, at RE11, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/25/realestate/25mort.
html; Zingales, note 3 supra; Kiplinger News, A Third of Americans Have No Qualms About Strategic Default, KIPLINGER (Sept. 22, 2010), 
at http://www.kiplinger.com/news/article.php/a-third-of-americans-have-no-qualms-about-800078057.html
  Though, perhaps the stigma of default is waning.  See Jane Hodges, More see walking on mortgage as a viable plan: ‘Strategic default’ los-
ing stigma as homes go deeper underwater, MSNBC.COM (12/20/2010), at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40704053/ns/business-real_estate/ 
56  A “non-recourse” state is a jurisdiction where the lender has no right to pursue the borrower’s personal assets if the amount received for 
the home in foreclosure is insufficient to satisfy the entire outstanding balance on the mortgage.  Apparently, 11 states do not allow a lender to 
pursue deficiency judgments and, in the states that do allow it, lenders rarely pursue the remedy.  Zinagles, note 3 supra.  
In the states where there is no statutory bar, and assuming there is no contractual bar, a lender may seek a deficiency judgment (difference 
between price in foreclosure sale and remaining outstanding balance).  In those situations, the incentive for the borrower to walk away is not as 
strong because of the possibility of having to pay the deficiency.  However, if lenders do not usually pursue this recourse, it may be worthwhile 
for the borrower to walk away and risk such a judgment. In that sense, the efficiency-morality issue is still implicated, but it is certainly more 
squarely in issue where the lender has no recourse beyond foreclosure.
57  Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Fear, Shame and the Social Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 971 (2010) (hereinafter “Fear, Shame and Social Management”); Brent T. White, Take this House and Shove it: the Emotional Drivers 
of Strategic Default, 63 SMU L. REV. 1279 (2010) (hereinafter “Emotional Drivers”); Brent T. White, The Morality of Strategic Default, 58 
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 155 (2010) (hereinafter “Morality of Strategic Default”).
58  White, Morality of Strategic Default, note 57, supra, at 157 (citing Shavell, supra).
59 Id. at 158.
60 Id. at 160. 
61  One could, perhaps, credibly argue that, in light of (1) the shifts in the housing market, (2) the role of lenders in causing this shift and (3) 
the fact that the lenders are in a better position to bear the risk, the doctrine of excuse should be expanded to relieve the homeowners of their 
obligations under the contracts.  For a more general discussion of expansion of the doctrine of excuse, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility, 
Impracticablity, and Frustration, 1 JOURNAL OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2009).
62 See Posting of Paul Solman to The BUSINESS DESK BLOG, What Does Justice in the Foreclosure Crisis Look Like?, PBS NEWS HOUR 
(11/24/2010),  http://www.pbs.org/newshour/businessdesk/2010/11/what-does-justice-in-the-forec.html  (discussing  “efficiency”  of  walking 
away).
63  Nick Timaraos, How Far Underwater Do Borrowers Sink Before Walking Away?, WSJ DEVELOPMENTS BLOG, Jun. 28, 2010,  http://
blogs.wsj.com/developments/2010/06/28/how-far-underwater-do-borrowers-sink-before-walking-away/
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more incentive there is to strategically default and save money for the eventual eviction.64 
Interestingly, one of the frequent concerns about strategic default is the effect it will have 
on a home borrower’s credit rating.65  Once the factor of a home borrower’s credit rating 
is added to the decision whether to default, the calculation becomes more complex.  In 
some cases, a factor against strategic default is stated as more than just the consideration 
of borrower’s credit rating; it even extends to concern about whether friends and family 
will harbor resentment as they continue to pay their own obligations.66  Indeed, to the 
extent that an injury to the home borrower’s credit rating and relationships is a reputational 
harm, the public discourse imitates the argument that efficient breach theory relies upon 
simplifying assumptions.
Nevertheless, in making the case for strategic default, one could further argue that the 
bank is no worse off relative to what it bargained for – after all, the lender expressly agreed 
to take on the risk of getting stuck with the home instead of getting repaid on the loan.  The 
right to foreclose is a remedy to which the parties agreed.67
Indeed, applying Professor Shavell’s argument that breach of contract is not necessarily 
immoral, it would seem that the mortgage contract expressly provides for what should 
happen in the event of a default by the home borrower: foreclosure.  Therefore, the moral 
obligations of the parties are expressed in the contract and, as long as the home borrower 
allows the foreclosure process to proceed, the home borrower has met her moral obligation. 
The foreclosure absolves the borrower of any moral obligation to continue to pay – 
because the bargain expressly frames the parties’ rights and, therefore, moral obligations. 
Incidentally, because the mortgage contract contains a specified remedy, it squares with 
the view of the subjects in Professor Wilkinson-Ryan’s study, which found that an agreed 
remedy changed their understanding about the nature and content of the promises made 
in the contract.68
Notwithstanding this finding, many of the blog comments and even newspaper 
editorials69 have reflected a public sense that the homeowners who strategically defaulted 
are acting “shamefully.”70  Professor White has identified and attempted to refute the 
following three points which are generally stated as the premise for the argument that 
strategic default is immoral: (1) the homeowners promised to pay their mortgages and it is 
immoral to break a promise, (2) foreclosures depreciate neighborhoods and negatively affect 
neighbors’ property values and (3) if all underwater homeowners defaulted, the housing 
market might crash.71  In arguing that strategic default is moral, Professor White directly 
challenges all three points and, in so doing, invites further discussion of the theoretical 
underpinnings of contract doctrine and the efficiency versus morality debate.
64  One article advises:
  In fact, a strategic default can take a year or longer, depending on state laws and how quickly the lender might be able to sell the repossessed 
home.
  Delays surrounding the foreclosure process mean homeowners often can stay in the home for up to two years before being evicted. In some 
cases, owners may be able to sock away as much as $30,000 or $40,000, Maddux [CEO of YouWalkAway.Com] says.
  Marci Geffner, 3 options for unloading house in tough times, STANDARD-EXAMINER (Nov. 11, 2010), at http://www.standard.net/topics/
business/2010/11/11/3-options-unloading-house-tough-times
  Indeed, amidst allegations of technical flaws in mortgage and foreclosure documents, Bank of America self-imposed a moratorium on foreclo-
sure sales, leading one commentator to quip that this made strategic default look even more attractive.  Felix Salmon, Strategic default just got 
a lot more attractive, REUTERS (FELIX SALMON BLOG) (Oct. 8, 2010), at 
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/10/08/strategic-default-just-got-a-lot-more-attractive/
65  Tedeschi note 55 supra (“A foreclosure will drop the borrower’s credit score by at least 100 points, and will remain on a credit report for 
seven years.”); see also Robert Celasch, Wait for the market to rebound, or cut your losses? SACRAMENTO BUSINESS JOURNAL (Oct. 
14, 2010), at http://www.bizjournals.com/sacramento/stories/2010/10/18/focus1.html?b=1287374400%255E4093841 (foreclosure will  lower 
credit rating 140-150 points).
66  Amy Fontinelle, Strategic Default: Should You Do it?, SF GATE (PROVIDED BY INVESTOPEDIA), (Nov. 11, 2010), at http://www.sf-
gate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2010/11/11/investopedia48377.DTL (“Choosing strategic default also has social implications. Friends, fam-
ily members, neighbors and other people who know about your decision may judge you negatively. They may see your behavior as irresponsible 
and/or immoral. People who are struggling to do everything in their power to keep their homes may resent you.”)
67  The lender’s miscalculation was, of course, the assumption that such a sharp decline in housing prices was very unlikely to occur and that 
very few, if any, homeowners would ever purposefully default. 
68  Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Efficient Breach?  A Psychological Experiment, note 54. 
69 See note 5, supra.
70 See note 10, supra.
71 See generally White, Morality of Strategic Default, note 58, supra.
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The first of these points, that breaking a promise is immoral, very directly implicates the 
more general, scholarly discussion about whether breach of contract has a moral dimension. 
In response, White has essentially invoked some of the complexities of the debate among 
contract scholars.   He argues that the social norm about keeping promises is not absolute 
but rather that “one should keep one’s promises unless one has a compelling enough reason 
not to.”72  In other words, morality is not a ‘yes or no’ question.  The context of the housing 
crisis and the specifics of the written loan documents play a role in the assessment of what 
is ethical.  Here, specific to the housing crisis, those who support strategic default point to 
the general unwillingness of lenders to renegotiate the loans and the widespread sense that 
many of the loans were imprudent, even predatory.73
Professor White’s second and third points address the general concern that strategic 
defaults are not good for the economy at large and implicate the question about which 
justification of contract doctrine favors the greater public good. 
The efficiency theorists would likely argue that strategic default makes sense not only 
for the borrower and lender but it also, in turn, efficiently allocates the world’s resources 
and increases the public wealth.  This was basically an argument made by one of the 
anonymous New York Times website comments that supported strategic default: “The 
upside: Money not spent on a mortgage payment can be spent on goods and services that 
will stimulate local economies.”74
Even so, with the example of strategic default, one can also see the argument that, if 
the law encourages breach of contract, efficient or otherwise, it may lead to a breakdown 
of confidence in the marketplace and, in turn, could actually inhibit market activity.  The 
housing crisis precipitated a credit crisis, making it difficult to obtain financing in all 
facets of the economy, including for small businesses and potential homebuyers.75  Even 
after receiving billions in taxpayer bailouts, banks tightened lending practices, nearly 
paralyzing the entire economy.  The banks were “worried” they would not get repaid; what 
occurred was a breakdown of confidence.76  In fact, then Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson 
commented on the bank bailouts: “Our purpose is to increase confidence in our banks and 
increase the confidence of banks…”77
 This point brings the conversation back to Professor Charles Fried’s observation that 
reneging on a promise (which he equates with the making of a contract) is an “abuse of 
confidence.”78  If nobody felt obligated to follow through with contractual obligations, the 
convention of contracting would collapse.  This appears to explain the social norms around 
keeping promises and the moral intuition that breaching a contract is wrong.  In fact, Luigi 
Zingales, a professor of finance and entrepreneurship, has commented that “[u]ndermining 
the social norm that people should pay their mortgages, as Lowenstein and White do, is . . 
. a very bad idea.  You might just as well say that when a theater is going up in flames, it’s 
‘rational’ to trample other people in rushing to the exits.”79
Professor Zingales’ argument is based on the devastating, domino effect that foreclosures 
have on communities and the property values of the neighboring homes.80  The frequent 
response to his argument is an intuitive and appealing one that presents a double standard: 
lenders and big corporations default all the time when it is in their financial interest to 
do so, why can’t homeowners?81  Remarkably, this apparent double standard presents an 
72 Id. at 159.
73 See generally White, Fear, Shame and the Social Management, note 58, supra.
74 See note 10, supra.
75 See generally Anatomy of a Meltdown, WASH. POST,  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/creditcrisis/
76  Frank Langfitt, Despite Cash Injection, Banks Cautious on Lending, NPR, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, Oct. 20, 2008, http://www.npr.
org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=95913064.
77 Id. 
78  Fried note 15 supra, at 16-17.
79  Zingales note 3 supra.
80 Id. (result of mass strategic defaults “put[s] the entire system at risk”).
81  White, Morality of Strategic Default, note 57 supra, at 163 (discussing Tishman Speyer default in loans on Stuyvesant Town); Lowenstein 
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interesting challenge to the frequent presumption of scholars that business and personal 
contracts should be theorized separately.82  It also points to how the futility of a unifying 
theory of contract doctrine leads to the law’s pragmatism, which can, however, potentially 
lead to its very incoherence.
Conclusion
 The current, public discourse about strategic default provides a rich example of the 
competing theoretical views of contract law and illustrates the failure of either morality or 
efficiency as a unifying descriptive or normative theory.  With the failure of a unifying theory, 
these theoretical poles form the basis for the parties’ competing arguments.  The lenders 
(and even the government)83 are attempting to stave off mass foreclosures by shaming 
the borrowers for reneging on the promise to repay the loans.  On the other hand, the 
defaulting homeowners (and those encouraging them) argue that there is nothing immoral 
about breaching a mortgage contract.  The parties’ respective arguments demonstrate that 
the question whether a breach of contract is immoral is more sophisticated than simply 
asking if someone reneged on a promise.  
To the extent that the debate has been framed as one of individual morality, perhaps the 
response of contract doctrine should be an amendment of the current doctrine of excuse, so 
that the homeowners are not technically in breach of contract in the first place.  This would 
force contract law to address whether the homeowners or lenders should bear the risk of 
the systemic failures that lead to the crisis.  As it stands, however, contract law and theory 
are not equipped to provide any clarity to the public discourse, which is too often inaptly 
framed as a question of individual morality.
In truth, the debate about strategic default may not be one for contract doctrine but, 
rather, a question about which housing policies and lending practices enable the greatest 
public good.  Because the concerns about strategic default – neighborhood depreciation and 
market collapse – are systemic, the solutions should be driven by those concerns.  Rather 
than shame individual borrowers who decide to walk away, and place upon their conscience 
the burdens of depreciated neighborhoods and market failures, a more meaningful public 
discourse would instead focus on appropriate incentives for them to stay in their homes and 
systemic reforms to avoid this situation in the future.  After all, the reason the individual 
morality of these homeowners is in a position to be challenged is a perfect storm that was 
occasioned in large measure by widespread, imprudent lending practices, and the morality 
of those practices may also be called into question.
note 7 supra.
  Jon Stewart’s The Daily Show pointed to this double standard when it “reported” on the Mortgage Bankers Association’s own strategic default 
on  its office space.   See THE DAILY SHOW (Oct. 7, 2010), at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-october-7-2010/mortgage-bankers-
association-strategic-default
82 See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
83  White, Shame Fear and the Social Management, note  57 supra; see also Fannie Mae, News Release (6/23/2010), at http://www.fanniemae.
com/newsreleases/2010/5071.jhtml (for seven years, Fannie Mae will not give government-backed loans to borrowers who strategically de-
fault).
“...the debate about 
strategic default 
may not be one for 
contract doctrine but, 
rather, a question 
about which housing 
policies and lending 
practices enable the 
greatest public good.”
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